Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed and finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk theorem extends to this setup. As is shown for an example, for a range of discount factors, the set of perfect public equilibria is reduced under certain conditions and efficiency improves when the players take into account private information. This model applies to many situations in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players' reaction.
Introduction
Infinitely repeated discounted games capture dynamic strategic interaction between impatient economic agents. Additional equilibria arise compared to one-shot games and the associated payoff vectors can be Pareto superior to those achieved in any stage game equilibrium. The well-known Folk theorem states this result. For infinitely repeated discounted games, it is obtained by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), thereafter FM. They are the first to show a Folk theorem with perfect monitoring, but unobservable mixed actions. Frequently, a player is assumed to observe his opponents' behavior immediately and perfectly, referred to as perfect monitoring. This assumption is relaxed in the imperfect monitoring literature, in which each player receives an imperfect private or public signal of every action profile played. 1 In this article, monitoring is delayed since each player obtains a private signal of the action chosen by every other player with a fixed and finite delay. These signals are perfect, and thus, a repeated game with delayed perfect monitoring is studied. Formally, for each pair of players in an infinitely repeated discounted game there exists a delay with which they observe each other's action choice. This delay might be asymmetric and is heterogeneous for different pairs of players. In each period, a player observes the actions chosen by a subset of players at different points of time in the past. The players take decisions under imperfect information in any but the first period.
The Folk theorem extends to the delayed perfect monitoring model, that is, any feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vector is supported by a perfect public equilibrium strategy profile when the players are sufficiently patient. Under this kind of strategy profiles, each player conditions his action choices only on publicly available observations. For an example additional results obtain: for a range of intermediate discount factors, the delay in observations may trigger a player's deviation from some previously agreed sequence of play. Thus, for impatient players, the set of perfect public equilibria is reduced in comparison to the perfect monitoring case under certain conditions. Moreover, private strategies, in general, improve efficiency in comparison with public ones. The next section introduces notation and definitions. In Sect. 3, general formal results are derived, additional ones are illustrated for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the related literature is surveyed. Before concluding, possible extensions are discussed.
Preliminaries
Each player i in the finite set of players I = {1, ..., n} has a finite set of pure actions A i . Pure action a i is an element of this set. The stage game's pure action space is A = × i∈I A i , with generic element a, called pure action profile. For any subset of players S ⊂ I, let A S = × i∈S A i , and denote by a S an element of this set. Player i's payoff function is a mapping h i : A → R, and the payoff function h : A → R n assigns a payoff vector to each pure action profile. The stage game in normal form is then the tuple G ≡ (I, (A i ) i∈I , (h i ) i∈I ). Define the convex hull of the finite set of payoff vectors corresponding to pure action profiles in G as co
is player i's mixed action space and H i : Σ → R is his payoff function for Σ = × i∈I Σ i . Let σ ∈ Σ be a mixed action profile. To emphasize player i's role, it is written as (σ i , σ −i ). The function H : Σ → R n assigns a payoff vector to each mixed action profile which consists of the players' randomization experiments and the pure actions they choose. It is assumed that the randomization experiments are not observable, but only the pure actions chosen. This is referred to as unobservable mixed actions.
